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//********** Kuhn, Values, and Theory Choice - October 3rd, 2019 ************//
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- We are about to embark on yet another wonderful trip into the realm of this class - indeed, this very one! And YOU (likely me) get to partake in our (my) adventure!

- As a reminder, the midterm exam will be distributed next week on Thursday as a take-home exam; it can cover any material we've covered up through today, so go back through your notes and double-check if you have any question you'd like to ask
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- So, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" was published in the early 1960s; the reading we had by Kuhn today was from about 10 years later, in response to people criticizing that his views meant choosing scientific theories was reduced to "mob psychology"
    - Kuhn defended that this was NOT his view and that he thought science was still DEEPLY rational - but at the same time, he's trying to defend that paradigm disputes really are "incommensurable," and that there is subjectivity in choosing between different theories

- So, how does he try to do this?
    - The first thing he does is that he gives 5 important, classical criteria for evaluating a "good" theory (and mentions that there may be more), and says that he agrees they're vital (pg. 322)!
        - The 5 are:
            - Accuracy
            - Consistency (internal logic and externally with existing theories)
            - Breadth of scope (should explain a wide variety of phenomena)
            - Simplicity
            - Fruitful (stimulates new research)
    - At the same time, he says that while these provide a basis for choosing among different theories, there's still incommensurability between different theories because these criteria are NOT hard-and-fast-rules
        - First off, these theories can be INTERPRETED differently by different, equally-rational scientists
            - Accuracy, for instance, seems objective - but in many cases one theory might be more accurate at one thing and less accurate at something else, and different people might focus on one or the other!
                - Phlogiston vs oxygen theory, for instance, had this issue: oxygen explained the weight of stuff after combustion, but phlogiston explained how metals could possibly work
                - Similarly, Copernicus' theory was simpler because it had less epicycles, but originally the Ptolemaic model was actually EASIER to calculate by hand!
        - These criteria might also be weighted differently by different scientists
            - One scientist might think accuracy is the most important; another might disagree and think, "Accuracy's well and good, but we NEED a theory to be consistent"
                - We see this in modern times, too; physicists who love string theory weight simplicity and elegance REALLY highly, even though it isn't directly testable
        - Why do scientists have these disagreements? Kuhn thinks it could be any number of things: the teachers the student had, previous discoveries, the country they grew up in, their social values, important historical events, their tolerance for risk and being wrong...
    - Kuhn stresses that while he DOES believe science has plenty of objective pieces, choosing theories inescapably has subjective elements
        - Is that subjective element impossible to get rid of, or is it just there because we're flawed human beings? That question has become increasingly prominent since Kuhn started this
    - Instead, Kuhn says these criteria of good theories are more like VALUES or "norms," rather than exact algorithmic rules
        - Kuhn views these working like how values work in the judicial system: the values themselves are objective, and can guide us, but they don't guarantee everyone with the same set of values will come to the same conclusions
        - So, Kuhn claims that there can be RATIONAL DISAGREEMENT in science, where people can legitimately disagree without being illogical or straight-up wrong
            - He even thinks this can be a good thing, because it means multiple theories get explored at any one time (meaning we don't put all our eggs in one scientific basket)

- Towards the end of his essay, Kuhn also mentions that just using the terms "objective" and "subjective" are problematic because of the way English works
    - Specifically, because there are 2 different meanings for "subjective"
        - In contrast to "objective," meaning it's down to individual choice and not arguable (e.g. "I like the color green" - you can't argue I'm wrong!)
        - (another one, something about making judgements, which can be questioned)

- So, what do we think about Kuhn's overall argument here?
    - One important question to ask: do we ever get scientific theories that are so well established they account for ALL the data? Kuhn doesn't seem to think so - do you?
        - Furthermore, there're many fields of science where certainty seems it'll be IMPOSSIBLE (e.g. psychology) - which one is more representative of "science?" Is physics the norm, or messier subjects?
        - Should we accept physics as the paradigmatic science? Is there even such a thing, or just a bunch of different scientific fields?
    - Another thing to note here: how do Kuhn's theories apply if we're deciding between 2 new theories, as opposed to an old and new?

- In this paper, notice that Kuhn also doesn't bring anything up about "normal science" and "revolutions"
    - Kuhn got a LOT of criticism for these terms in his original book, with many people pointing out that there are some fields that don't have obvious "revolutions"
        - Biology, for instance, didn't really have a ground-shaking paradigm shift - instead, people knew about gaps in stuff like heredity and proceeded to fill those gaps
    - So, people argued that breaking scientific history down into just these 2 periods was far too simplistic, and Kuhn backed off of this claim in later years

- One last question: how is Kuhn's work a critique of logical empiricism? Some of Kuhn's work got critiqued, but a LOT of people think his work was the death-knell of logical empiricism
    - The main critique is that science HAS to involve subjective decision-making at some point before you can return to a logical process - and therefore, science can't be fully explained by just applying strictly logical decision procedures
        - Most people agree with Kuhn here, but there are still some people who try to fight for verificationism on purely logical grounds

- ...and so, with that, we're done with the "historical readings" for this class
    - Kuhn's work changed the philosophy of science in a number of important ways, but 2 ways especially:
        - After Kuhn, people realized that they needed to pay attention to sciences besides physics, and see what problems that raised
        - Kuhn also rightly pressed on the need to study the scientific process itself, and question it
            - Hempel, for instance, drew his scientific ideals mostly from logic rather than actually looking at how "real science" gets done
    - So, our next unit will be us looking at a grab-bag of topics from post-Kuhnian philosophers, and exploring the issues they raised

- Alright, have a good weekend!